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NOTE
THE APPLICATION OF TITLE IX TO SCHOOL
ATHLETIC PROGRAMS
Since the enactment of title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, considerable controversy has surrounded the statute's application
to school athletic programs. Title IX forbids discrimination based on sex
in "any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." 1 In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) issued regulations applying title IX specifically to athletics. 2 In
those regulations, HEW interpreted the statute as extending to athletic
programs in any institution receiving federal money, whether or not the
money is used directly in the program. 3 At the time the regulations
were issued, commentators reached varying conclusions about the validity of the regulations and the future impact of title IX in general on
4
school athletics.
Federal courts have also reached differing conclusions as to the statute's scope.5 Some courts have used an institutional approach, applying
title IX to any program in an institution receiving federal aid; other
courts have taken a programmatic approach, limiting title IX to indi6
vidual programs receiving federal aid.
This Note analyzes the problems of determining title IX's scope
and suggests a framework for resolution of the issue. The Note concludes that to effectuate the purpose of title IX, the statute must reach
athletic programs in any school whose athletic program derives a sub7
stantial benefit either directly or indirectly from the federal assistance.
1
2

3

20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
See 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (1975).
The regulations in 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(a) (1975) extend the prohibition against sex-

based discrimination to any "recipient" of federal financial assistance. "Recipient," as defined
in 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(h) (1975), refers to an institution receiving the assistance. The HEW
interpretation, therefore, is an institutional one.
4 See, e.g., Cox, IntercollegiateAthktics and Title IX,46 GEO. WASH. L. REv.34 (1977)
(arguing for a broad application of title IX to intercollegiate athletics); Kuhn, Title IX Employment and Athletics are Outside HEW'sJurisdiction, 65 GEO. L.J. 49 (1976) (title IX does not
apply to athletic programs); Todd, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments. Preventing Sex
Dicrminationin PublicSchools, 53 Tax. L. REV. 103 (1974) (arguing for the so-called benefiting approach to title IX); Note, Sex DisriminationandIntercollegiateAthletics: FuttingSome Auscle
on Title IX, 88 YALE L.J. 1254 (1979) (arguing for more demanding regulations under title

IX).
5
6
7

See infra notes 42-64 and accompanying text.
See infia notes 8-22 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 65-103 and accompanying text.
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TITLE IX
I
BACKGROUND

A.

Legislative History of Title IX

The legislative history of title IX does not clarify the proper scope
of application of title IX to a school's athletic program. The conflict is
over whether the statute should apply only to particular programs
within a school (the "programmatic" approach), or whether it is meant
to encompass any program run by a school receiving federal money (the
"institutional" approach).8 The issue is particularly important in the
area of athletics, because many schools that receive federal money do
not apply any of that money directly to their athletic programs. 9 Under
the programmatic approach to title IX, these schools' athletic programs
would not be required to comply with the statute, while under the institutional interpretation, the programs would be within title IX's scope.
It is difficult to find in the legislative history specific discussion of
the meaning of the words "program or activity" as used in title IX.1o
8 Four courts have decided the issue in the context of athletics. See infra notes 42-64 and
accompanying text.
9 According to the present Athletic Director of Cornell University, Michael Slive, this is
generally true in the nation's colleges. Federal financial assistance does not normally go specifically to athletic programs.
10
During congressional debate over Senator Bayh's original version of title IX, Senator
Dominick asked Senator Bayh about the meaning of "any program or activity":
Mr. DOMINICK. The provisions on page 1, under section 601, refer to
the fact that no one shall be denied the benefits of any program or activity
conducted, et cetera.
The words "any program or activity," in what way is the Senator thinking here? Is he thinking in terms of dormitory facilities, is he thinking in
terms of athletic facilities or equipment, or in what terms are we dealing here?
Or are we dealing with just educational requirements?
I think it is important, for example, because we have institutions of learning which, because of circumstances such as I have pointed out, may feel they
do not have dormitory facilities which are adequate, or they may feel, as some
institutions are already saying, that you cannot segregate dormitories anyway.
But suppose they want to segregate the dormitories: can they do it?
Mr. BAYH. The rulemaking powers referred to earlier, I think, give the
Secretary discretion to take care of this particular policy problem. I do not
read this as requiring integration of dormitories between the sexes, nor do I
feel it mandates the desegregation of football fields. What we are trying to do
is provide equal access for women and men students to the educational process and the extracurricular activities in a school, where there is not a unique
facet such as football involved. We are not requiring that intercollegiate football be desegregated, nor that the men's locker room be desegregated.
117 CONG. Rsc. 30407 (1971). The version of title IX at issue during this exchange differed
from the one eventually enacted, see in/ta note 11 and accompanying text, and did not involve
the issue discussed in this Note. When discussing his amended version six months later, Senator Bayh stated that "the heart of this amendment is a provision banning sex discrimination
in educational programs receiving Federal funds." 118 CONG. Rac. 5803 (1972). This comment was part of his general discussion of title IX as a means of "clos[ing] loopholes" in
antidiscrimination legislation. Id His use of the word "programs" appears to have no real
significance.
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The bill originally introduced by Senator Bayh specifically applied to
programs in institutions receiving federal assistance." In light of this
language compliance with title IX undoubtedly would have been mandated in all programs in a recipient institution. The institutional language in the first proposal, however, did not appear in the bill as
enacted. 12 This omission may reflect some congressional intent to restrict title IX's applicability on a program-by-program basis.13 On the
other hand, legislative history following enactment of title IX suggests a
slightly different approach. Several proposals to exempt athletics from
title IX failed to gain significant support.14 One particularly revealing
example was an amendment proposed by Senator Tower, 15 which
would have excluded athletics completely from title IX coverage. Senator Tower later modified his proposal to exclude only revenue-producing sports, 16 but Congress voted not to approve the Senator's
amendment.
Passage of section 844 of the Education Amendments of 197417 also
bears upon congressional understanding of title IX. In passing the provision, Congress apparently assumed that title IX applied to athletics,
because section 844 required the Secretary of HEW to publish regulations regarding athletics within thirty days.18 Under a strictly programmatic reading of the statute, such regulations would have been
unnecessary because athletics would have been almost entirely excluded
from the statute's reach. 19 This evidence suggests that Congress envisioned some relationship between athletics and title IX.
The regulations that HEW issued in 1975 interpreted title IX in a
11 The exact language of that original proposal prohibited sex discrimination "under
any program or activity conducted by a public institution of higher education, or any school
or department of graduate education, which is a recipient of Federal financial assistance for
any education program or activity. . . ." 117 CONG. R=c. 30156 (1971).
12 The statute as enacted prohibits sex discrimination "under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
13 See Kuhn, supra note 4, at 64.
14 See Amend. 390 to S. 2657, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CoNG. REC. 28144 (1976) (defining federal financial assistance as that received directly from the federal government);
Amend. 389 to S. 2657, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 28136 (1976) (redefining program or activity to include only curriculum requirements); S. 2146, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121
CONG. REc. 23845 (1975) (limiting title IX coverage to programs directly receiving federal
assistance); S. 2106, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 22775 (1975) (reintroducing revenue-producing exception); S. Con. Res. 46, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 17300
(1975) (disapproving proposed federal regulations); Amend. 1343 to S. 1539, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., 120 CONG. REG. 15322 (1974) (excluding revenue-producing sports from title IX).
15 See 120 CONG. REC. 15322-23 (1974).
16 See id
17 Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 612.
18 See Kuhn, sura note 4, at 75-76. Kuhn argues that this amendment, relied on by
HEW to support its interpretation of title IX, does not in fact indicate that Congress intended
title IX to apply to athletics. She claims that Congress understood that the amendment
would apply only if a court ruled that title IX extended to athletics.
19 See Cox, supra note 4, at 36 n.15.
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strictly institutional manner. 20 In view of the considerable controversy
over the scope of title IX in relation to athletics, 2t HEW's broad interpretation of the statute is significant. This is especially true because after the issuance of the regulations, Congress did not invalidate them as it
22
could have under its statutory power to review title IX regulations.
Taken as a whole, then, the legislative history provides no clear indication of how the issue should be resolved.
B.

Case Law Under Title IX and Analogous Statutes

Case law under title IX and analogous civil rights statutes is similarly ambiguous. Language contained in both title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 196423 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197324
is identical to that of title IX, 25 and the same issue has arisen under
these statutes.
Under title VI, for example, courts have differed sharply over
whether the statute applies on a programmatic or institutional basis. In
Bob Jones University v. Johnson,26 221 students received federal assistance
under a Veterans Administration program. 2 7 In holding that this fact
alone brought the university as a whole within title VI, the court emphasized the manner in which these grants benefited the whole school. 28
More recently, in Yakin v. University ofIllinois,29 the plaintiff sued under
title VI after he was terminated from the school's Ph.D. program in psychology. The court rejected the university's argument that the case did
not fall within the scope of the statute because neither the psychology
department nor a special Program for Graduate Education Opportunity
in which the plaintiff participated received federal money,30 and specifically held that "it does not matter whether the University, the Depart'3
ment or the GEO program receives the federal financial assistance." '
20
21
22
23
24
25

See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See generall 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976) (title VI).
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979) ("Title IX was pat-

terned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.") (footnote omitted); see also 118 CONG.
Rhc. 5807 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
26 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aj'dmm., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
27 See 396 F. Supp. at 600.
28 See id. at 602-03. There are two significant aspects of the case in relation to the scope
of title IX. First, the federal financial assistance found to satisfy title VI in BobJones University
consisted of aid accruing directly to 221 students; it did not go directly to the institution.
Second, the broad notion of benefit described by the court has obvious implications for title
IX analysis.
29 508 F. Supp. 848 (N.D. Il1. 1981).
30 See id at 850.
31 Id; see also Flanagan v. President of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C.
1976) (title VI applied to alleged discrimination in financial aid awards even though scholarship program received no federal assistance).
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In contrast is the programmatic approach adopted in Boardof Public Instruction v.Finc. 32 In considering the school board's challenge to HEW's
decision to terminate federal funds, the court emphasized that termina'33
tion decisions must be made on "a program by program basis."
Two recent decisions under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which contains language identical to that of title IX, have interpreted the statute to prohibit discrimination against handicapped persons in institutions receiving federal assistance, and not merely in the
particular programs receiving that assistance.3 4 Significantly, both cases
involved alleged discrimination within the schools' athletic programs.
The schools argued unsuccessfully that they were exempt from section
504 because the athletic departments received no federal funds. 35 Because these cases involved athletic programs, the policy considerations
are similar to those arising under title IX.
Courts have also faced the problem of interpreting title IX's apparently program-specific language in contexts other than athletics. In deciding whether title IX covers employment practices in educational
institutions, the Supreme Court recently held in North Haven BoardofEd37
ucation v. Be/I 36 that title IX does apply to employment discrimination.
Although the Court emphasized the program-specific nature of title IX,
it nevertheless upheld federal regulations that appeared to apply on an
institutional basis. 38 Before North Haven, some courts had used the language of title IX to bolster their conclusion that federal regulations purporting to govern employment are invalid. 39 These cases suggested that
414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
Id at 1078-79. The court's approach is in direct conflict with HEW's subsequent
regulations. For a discussion of the case in relation to the regulations, see Kuhn, supra note 4,
at 68-69.
34 Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.NJ. 1980).
35 In Poole, the South Plainfield Board of Education refused to allow a student with only
one kidney to participate in the school wrestling program. The Board argued that the interscholastic sports program received no federal financial assistance. The court relied primarily
on HEW's interpretation as evidenced by the regulations in finding a violation of § 504. See
Poole, 490 F. Supp. at 950-5 1. In Wright, the plaintiff was a Columbia University student who
was denied the opportunity to play football for his school because of a visual handicap. The
court relied on the federal regulations and to a large extent on social policy in its decision. See
Wright, 520 F. Supp. at 792; infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
36
102 S. Ct. 1912 (1982).
37 Seeid at 1913.
38 See id at 1926-27; see also 45 Fed. Reg. 30962 (1980). Although the Court explicitly
declined to define "program" under title IX, its discussion of the statute's program-specific
nature suggests that a strictly institutional interpretation of title IX is untenable. See 102 S.
Ct. at 1926-27. The Court insisted that any application of title IX and the federal regulations
be consistent with the programmatic nature of the statute. See id
39 See general'y Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 736-37 (5th Cir.
1980) (strictly programmatic approach applied in a fund-termination case under title IX;
federal regulations invalid because they purport to prohibit sex discrimination in any program in an institution receiving federal money, thus exceeding the statutory authority of title
32
33
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the regulations exceed the authority of title IX because the statute covers only specific programs, and not institutional policies like employment practices. 40 Other title IX cases involving nonathletic contexts
such as employment policy, however, have adopted a broader, institu41
tional reading of the statute.
C.

Athletic Programs and Title IX

It is within this context of uncertainty over the scope of title IX that
the question of the extent of the statute's applicability to athletics arises.
Case law, like the legislative history, does not provide definitive guidance in analyzing the problem of applying title IX to school athletic
programs. Recent sex discrimination suits brought in federal court have
raised issues with significant implications for the administration of
school athletic programs.
Ohen v. Ann Arbor School Board,42 involved a title IX action in which
the plaintiff alleged that his daughter had been dropped from the
school's golf team because of her sex. 43 The school board claimed that it
was not subject to the statute because its athletic program received no
IX), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 2264 (1982) (remanded for reconsideration in light of North Haven
Board of Educ. v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1919 (1982)); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F.
Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (criticized in North Haven v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 785 (2d
Cir. 1980)), af'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
40 The court in Romeo, 438 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aJ'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979), held that HEW does not have authority under title IX
to regulate employment. It based its decision in part on the program-specific nature of the
language in title IX:
HEW's authority to terminate federal funds for non-compliance with § 1682
is "limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which
such non-compliance has been found."...
This limitation on HEW's enforcement power is implicitly a limitation
on HEW's authority to regulate as well. HEW cannot regulate the practice of
an educational institution unless those practices result in sex discrimination
against the beneficiaries of some federally assisted education program operated by the institution. The focus of § 1681--elimination of sex discrimination in federally funded education programs-must be the focus of HEW's
regulations under § 1682 as well. To this extent, HEW's regulatory power is
also "program specific."
Id at 1033.
41
See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 692-93 (3d Cir. 1982) (institutional
approach applied; government loans and grants to students brought the college under title
IX); Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Hufstedler, 499 F. Supp. 496 (S.D. Fla. 1980), afd, 652 F.2d
445 (5th Cir. 1981) (University of Miami honor society challenged validity of regulation
under title IX; regulation upheld with language of an institutional approach, emphasizing
indirect benefits to programs within an institution), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 3475 (1982) (remand
for reconsideration in light of North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912 (1982)).
42
507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
43
See id at 1378. Originally, the plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order allowing
his daughter to play for the golf team and a permanent injunction prohibiting sex discrimination in selection of the team's members. After this relief was denied, the plaintiff filed an
amended complaint alleging violations of title IX and state law. In the meantime, the school
established a separate golf team for girls and the plaintiff abandoned all claims except one for
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direct federal financial assistance.4 4 The plaintiff argued for an institutional approach to title IX in order to hold the school board to the requirements of the statute. The court, however, opted for a
programmatic interpretation, 45 relying primarily upon the language of
the statute and finding further support in both the legislative history
46
and case law under title VI and title IX. 47
In Bennett v. West Texas State University, a class action brought by

six female athletes at West Texas State University, the school argued
that its athletic program received no direct federal financial assistance
and thus was not subject to title IX regulations. 48 The court, however,
accepted the defendant's programmatic interpretation of title IX using
analysis similar to that used in Othen. 49 The court also rejected the
plaintiff's contention that the school's athletic program benefited from
federal financial assistance in the form of loans and grants to students
and funds for dormitories and dining halls. 50 In so doing, it rejected the
argument that indirect benefits to an athletic program may bring it
within title IX.
In University of Richmond v. Bell,5 1 the school sought injunctive and
declaratory relief to prevent the Department of Education from investigating its athletic program for title IX compliance. The court, relying
heavily upon the "program-specific" dicta found in the Supreme Court's
discussion of title IX in North Haven, 52 rejected an institutional approach
to the statute: "Defendants have failed entirely to establish a nexus between federal financial assistance and the athletic program at [the University]."15 3 Thus, the court held that the Department was not
attorney's fees. Seegeneral 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). Thus, the court was forced to decide the
issues under title IX in order to rule on the claim for attorney's fees. Id at 1378-79.
44 See id at 1380. The plaintiff did not contest the defendant's assertion that none of the
school district's federal funding went to athletics. See id
45

See id

See id at 1381-87. The court placed particular emphasis in this context on § 1682 and
§ 1684 of title IX. Section 1682 provides the statutory authority for title IX regulations and
also for termination of financial assistance to serve as an enforcement power. The section is
programmatic in its language. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). Section 1684, on the other hand,
deals with persons with impaired vision and is institutional in its language. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1684 (1976). The court in 0hen reasoned that this is evidence of congressional awareness of
the distinction between the two approaches.
47 525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
48 See id at 78.
49 See id at 78-80. The court relied on the language in 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1682 and
1684. See id It also found support in a number of title IX cases considering whether employment practices are within the statute. See id at 79-80. The main issue in cases involving
employment practices is whether employees are a protected class under title IX. Some courts
have relied on title IX's programmatic language in these cases to limit the statute's applicability. See sufira notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
50 See 525 F. Supp. at 80-81.
51 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982).
52 See id at 325-27.
53 Id at 331.
46
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authorized to investigate the school's athletic program. 54
Despite these decisions, the Third Circuit in Haffer v. Temple Univer55
sity applied a different approach. The district court had adopted an
institutional approach to title IX, finding support in the legislative history and case law. 56 The court held that despite the absence of direct
assistance to athletics, because Temple received federal financial assistance in other ways, the statute controlled the school's athletic program. 57 Significantly, the district court went further and found that

even under a programmatic approach, Temple's athletic program
would be subject to title IX because of the nexus between the federal
assistance to Temple and the athletic program. 58 The court offered as
examples federal financial assistance for the salaries of employees in the
program, financial aid to student athletes, and federal money for con59
struction of school facilities used by the athletic program at times.
This aspect of the decision is in direct contrast to the Bennett court's
analysis. 6°
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusions. 6' Relying exclusively on its own decision less than a month earlier in Grove City
College v. Bell 62 the court adopted the institutional view, interpreting
the program or activity referred to in title IX as Temple University as a
whole. 63 The court concluded, therefore, that the athletic program necessarily fell within title IX and declined to address the district court's
suggestion that the close connection between the federal financial assistance and Temple's athletic program brought the school within title IX
even under a programmatic approach. 6 4
54 See id at 327. The court also rejected the benefits approach to title IX in this context,
relying on Othen and Bennett. See id at 328-29.
55
688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
56 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
57 See id at 532-33.
58 See id. at 540. The court based its holding on alternative grounds. The court suggested that the institutional and programmatic approaches would both produce the same
result. See id This is an expansion of the programmatic approach adopted in Othen and
Bennett because of its broad interpretation of the phrase "receiving federal financial assistance." See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
59 See 524 F. Supp. at 540.
60
525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
61
688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
62 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982). Grove City invoked the authority of the Department of
Education to enforce title IX against a college that, as part of its philosophy, refuses all forms
of federal financial assistance, but whose students participate in federal loan and grant programs. The court held that despite the program-specific language of the statute that the
Supreme Court had emphasized in North Haven, the aid to Grove City students brought the
school as a whole within title IX: "Because the federal grants made to Grove's students necessarily inure to the benefit of the entire College, the 'program' here must be defined as the
entire institution of Grove City College." Id at 700 (footnote omitted). This conclusion,
based on an institutional approach, compelled the result in Haffr.
63 See 688 F.2d at 17.
64 See id
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II
ANALYSIS

Neither the strictly programmatic nor the strictly institutional approach to title IX reconciles the language of the statute with the goal of
eliminating sex discrimination in education when federal funds are
somehow used to effect the discrimination. 65 To achieve the purposes of
title IX, courts should require a clear connection between federal assistance to the institution and the athletic program. This inquiry will help
ensure that the challenged program is benefiting from the federal assistance. This analysis does not necessitate a finding that the federal aid
goes directly to the atheletic program, but that federal assistance to
other programs in the school or to students at the school 66 has a significant effect on school athletics. This approach requires a factual inquiry
in each case to determine the school's reliance on federal aid and the
extent to which the athletic program benefits from the aid. When that
benefit is substantial, a plaintiff alleging sex discrimination should be
able to rely on title IX. This method of analysis offers advantages over
both a strict programmatic approach and a strict institutional approach.
The strongest argument for the strict programmatic approach
adopted in Bennett 67 and O/hen 68 is the clear language of section 1681,
which forbids sex discrimination in "any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.1 69 Analyzing this phrase in conjunction with the program-specific wording of the termination provision
of section 1682,70 reveals the support for the strictly programmatic approach. 7' Despite the persuasiveness of this argument, such an approach is undesirable because it conflicts with the spirit of title X 72 and
unnecessarily limits its scope.
Athletic programs are an integral part of a school's educational
program, and discrimination in athletics has a pervasive impact on the
school as a whole. This analysis has been used in race-discrimination
65 The language clearly requires the presence of federal financial assistance. The enforcement mechanism-termination of federal money-indicates the desire to eliminate
federally financed discrimination. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1682 (1976).
66 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
67 525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
68 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
69 See supra note 12; see also Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., 525 F. Supp. at 79;
Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. at 1381-82.
70
71

See supra note 46.
See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.

72 Compare this view with that expressed in Note, supra note 4, at 1264-69 (emphasizing
"the underlying power of sport as a social institution" id at 1267). The Note suggests that
title IX was meant to reduce sex-role stereotyping in education and, as a result, in society as a
whole. See id at 1266. Under this view, it is especially important that title IX be interpreted
broadly with respect to athletic programs because schools have traditionally emphasized male

sports.
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cases to justify fund termination under title VI, 73 and applies here as
well. To deny the protections of title IX to female athletes is to sanction

discrimination in a significant school activity.
Furthermore, distinguishing between the policy of a school athletic
department and the policy of the institution as a whole is often difficult.
For example, in Wright v. Columbia University, 74 the court pointed out that

it was Columbia University as an institution, rather than the athletic
program itself, that denied a handicapped student the right to play football.75 The implication is that it is not realistic to view an athletic program as completely independent of the institution. Decisions about
athletic policy are often made by the school administrators, and not by
the athletic department alone. For instance, if a school athletic department decides to institute new teams for women, the board of trustees or
the president often must approve the proposal. Because of the fungibility of money, the strictly programmatic approach also creates the possibility that a school will be able to avoid the reach of title IX by
channeling private funds into sensitive areas, and reserving federal
76
money for those programs that do not discriminate.
73 See Othen, 507 F. Supp. at 1387. The Othen court suggested that sex discrimination in
athletics differs from racially discriminatory admissions policies in that the latter affects all
programs within the institution:
Charges which allege sex discrimination against an educational institution or system regarding only one program or activity force the court to look
with more particularity at the "program and activity" language of Title IX
than is required where a charge of racial discrimination has been made
against the institution as a whole.
. . . Since most Title VI cases that have enforced agency regulations respecting termination of federal financial assistance have involved racial discrimination on an institution-wide basis, the various courts' affirmances of full
funding cut-offs in those cases are not helpful to indicte ways in which the
court should respond in this kind of case.
Id In Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980), the court rejected the idea that sex discrimination in isolated programs affects an entire institution:
"[W]e cannot find sanction in the statute for [the Secretary of HEW's] conclusion that any
discrimination in an entire school system so taints the system as to permit termination of all
federal aid even though federally assisted programs are administered impeccably." Id at 737.
74 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
75 See id at 792. The court recognized that athletic-department policy is often dictated
by school administration:
Clearly, Columbia has consistently represented to plaintiff that the University
as a whole, not the limited entity of the athletic program, was the official
decisionmaker. Therefore, even accepting Columbia's argument that Section
504 does not apply to the football team as a discrete entity which does not
receive federal funds, the Section obviously applies to the University which
made this ultimate decision. Consequently, if plaintiff was the victim of discrimination based upon his handicap, the University, not the athletic program, is the party responsible therefor.
Id This problem would clearly exist in many athletic-department policies that lead to claims
of sex discrimination.
76 Moreover, to accept defendant's argument would allow major institutions receiving substantial amounts of federal aid to dissect themselves, at whim, into
discrete entities, to allocate federal dollars into programs which cannot dis-
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Another problem arises when the school's athletic program is
financially self-supporting. Successful football and basketball programs
in major universities sometimes produce enough revenue to exist independently of outside financial sources. 7 7 Although a clear connection
between federal assistance to the university and the athletic program is
less apparent, 78 an extension of the reasoning suggested in Wright 79 is
appropriate. The success of a major university's athletic program reflects on the reputation of the university as a whole. The teams represent the university in competition and are dependent upon the support
of alumni who represent other university programs in their professional
lives. Furthermore, the teams' ability to attract athletes to the university partly depends upon the reputation of the entire university, as well
as on the reputation of its athletic program. Finally, even if an athletic
department is financially independent, its policy still may be subject to
review by the school's president and trustees. For these reasons, viewing
the financially independent athletic department as a wholly separate entity is illogical. Accordingly, a title IX plaintiff should be able to rely on
title IX when a sufficiently close connection exists between federal
financial assistance, the school, and the athletic program.
Although the strictly institutional approach ofHafr8 ° is well suited
to title IX's overall objective of eliminating sex discrimination in institutions receiving federal financial aid, the approach cannot be reconciled
with the program-specific language of the statute.8 1 Furthermore, the
institutional approach is clearly inadequate in those cases in which federal assistance to the school is completely unconnected with the athletic
program. In University ofRichmond v. Bell,82 for example, the Department
of Education based its authority to investigate charges of sex discriminacriminate against handicapped persons, and to free privately obtained funds
from those programs and instead to channel such money into programs purportedly immune from Section 504 strictures.
520 F. Supp. at 792; see also Cox, supra note 4, at 37 ("A federal grant to a university's biology
department, for example, could benefit the athletic program by freeing university funds for
sports programs.").
77 See Cox, supra note 4, at 37 & n.21.
78 Cox argues that self-supporting athletic departments should not be exempt from title
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An exception for self-supporting programs would permit institutions that operate athletic programs at only a slight deficit to become exempt from Title
IX merely by cutting back or eliminating non-revenue producing sports activities. A university could, for example, eliminate all financially dependent women's teams and avoid Title IX in the very area the statute was designed to
affect.
Cox, supra note 4, at 37. Despite the persuasiveness of this argument, the statute requires that
federal funds be involved in some way.
79 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
80 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aftd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
81 See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
82 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982).
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tion in the athletic program on the University's receipt of a $1,900 grant
from the College Library Resources Program. 83 By statute, the funds
could only be used to purchase designated library materials.8 4 These
limitations on the grant made it obvious that the athletic department
received no benefit; this clearly was not a case in which federal funds
received by the university would in turn release university funds for athletic department use.
The approach of Stewart v. New York University8 5 is superior to both
the programmatic and the institutional approaches. Stewart involved a
title IX challenge to a law school's admissions policy. In holding that
the plaintiff failed to state a claim under title IX, the court determined
that the connection between federal funds used to construct a law school
dormitory and the law school admissions policy was insufficient. 86 This
approach may also usefully be applied to claims alleging sex discrimination in athletic programs. The requirement of a clear connection between federal financial assistance to the institution and the athletic
program ensures that the program has in some way benefited from federal aid, and also satisfies title IX's purpose without requiring a strained
reading of the statute's language.
Application of this approach to the title IX cases previously discussed 87 demonstrates its merits. In Othen, 88 for example, ihe school
board showed that its federal financial assistance in the form of federal
impact aid8 9 amounted to only .12% of its total budget in 1979.0 This
small amount of federal aid could hardly have affected the athletic program in any significant way. 9' Thus, the result in Othen might not
change under the proposed approach.
On the other hand, this analysis would probably change the result
in Bennett,92 in which the plaintiffs apparently had various depositions to
support their contention that the athletic program of West Texas State
83 See general/, 20 U.S.C. § 1029 (Supp. IV 1980 & Supp. V 1981).
84 See 20 U.S.C. § 1029(d) (Supp. IV 1980 & Supp. V 1981).
85 430 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
86 See id at 1314.
87 See supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
88 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981); see supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
89 See 507 F. Supp. at 1389-90. Federal impact aid compensates school districts for the
loss of tax revenues that results from the presence of federal installations in the area and for
the added expense of educating children who enter the district because of the installation. Id;
see 20 U.S.C. § 236 (1976) (declaration of policy behind federal impact aid). The court in
Othen held that "[flederal impact aid received by a school district does not constitute the type
of federal financial assistance to a specific education program or activity envisioned by Title
IX." 507 F. Supp. at 1389.
90 507 F. Supp. at 1390.
91
The court emphasized the insignificance of the amount involved. See id In general,
however, nothing in title IX requires a certain minimum amount of federal financial assistance to invoke the statute.
92 525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981); see supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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University benefited substantially from the close connection between
different types of federal financial assistance and the program. 93 The
Bennett court found this evidence irrelevant, however, because it rejected
the idea that indirect aid to an athletic program could invoke title IX
coverage.9 4 The court labeled the type of aid involved as "general and
nonspecific" 95 and reasoned that any benefit to the athletic program
was remote. The court concluded that federal aid designed to benefit
students in general or the institution as a whole would not be sufficient
to bring specific programs within title IX, even if the programs benefited indirectly from the aid.96
The effect of this analysis on the facts of University ofRichmond v. Bell
is unclear. 97 The Department of Education made no attempt to introduce evidence of a connection between federal financial assistance to the
University of Richmond and its athletic program. 98 In fact, the Department relied only on a $1,900 Library Resource Grant and federal assistance in the form of grants and loans to students at Richmond to justify
its investigation under title X. 9 9 Although this would have sufficed
under the strictly institutional analysis urged by the Department, the
court accepted the program-specific interpretation of title IX. 00 Thus,
other facts may have existed that would have established a close enough
connection between the athletic program and federal financial assistance to invoke title IX under the proposed analysis.
In Hffer, 101 on the other hand, plaintiffs showed a significant relationship between the $19,000,000 in federal financial assistance received
by Temple and the school's athletic program. 10 2 While this assistance
was indirect in the sense that no funds were specifically earmarked for
the athletic program, the program derived some significant benefit from
the federal assistance.10 3 Undoubtedly when a plaintiff alleging sex discrimination in an athletic program can show this kind of benefit to the
program from federal aid, title IX should apply to restrict discriminatory practices within the athletic program.

101

See 525 F. Supp. at 80.
See id at 80-81.
Id
See id at 81.
543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982).
Seeid at 331.
See id at 323-24.
See id at 327.
524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981).

102

See id at 540.

93
94
95

96
97
98

99
100

103 The court in Ha.fer held that at least some of the federal funding going to Temple
University was so "closely connected" to the athletic program that it constituted direct assistance for purposes of title IX. Id
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CONCLUSION

Neither the strictly programmatic nor the strictly institutional approach of title IX can successfully meet the goal of eliminating sex discrimination in athletic programs. Courts should instead require a
plaintiff alleging sex discrimination to establish a connection between
federal assistance to the institution and the athletic program. This analysis will help determine whether the challenged program either directly
or indirectly benefits from the federal assistance. When the benefit is
substantial, the plaintiff should be allowed to proceed in a title IX suit.
Such an approach allows a court to reach a result that satisfies the spirit
of title IX without straining the statute's language beyond its logical
meaning.
Joseph E Krakora

